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Abstract:  The role of indirect taxes in social policy is investigated by 
1) comparing the distributional pattern of indirect taxes with the one 
of personal income taxes and social security contributions; 
2) calculating the indirect tax liabilities for recipients of social benefits; 
3) assessing the distributional impact of shifting the financing of social 
security from contributions to indirect taxes. For this purpose we 
combine the data of the Household Budget Survey and the Socio-
Economic Panel, as well as two microsimulation models, namely 
ASTER (for the calculation of indirect taxes) and MISIM (for the 
calculation of personal income taxes and social contributions). 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
Social security in Belgium is mainly financed through social security 
contributions: 45% of the budget comes from employer contributions and about 30% 
from own contributions (Verslag Hoge Raad voor Werkgelegenheid, 2004). As the 
wage cost in Belgium is high, voices are raised to reduce social contributions and to 
look for alternative sources. One of the ways often put forward is an increase of 
indirect taxes. The Belgian Planbureau (Bassilière et al., 2005) has made some 
simulations, calculating the macro effects of a shift from social contributions to 
indirect taxes. An often used argument for such a shift is that tax on labour income is 
a distortion that results in an efficiency loss. This is undoubtedly true, but misses the 
point. Fifty years of second best analysis have taught us that removing one single 
distortion in an environment where many other distortions remain, is not necessarily 
welfare enhancing. And taking the government revenue constraint into account, the 
real question is whether a shift from labour taxes to other forms of revenues would 
diminish the overall distortion. Moreover, apart from efficiency considerations, it is 
also important to include the distributional side of the coin. The distributional 
consequences of such a shift, however, have not been investigated. It is important to 
look at the micro level as well, given the fact that payroll taxes affect final income of 
households, and hence the income distribution, and given that the government takes 
back part of social benefits through taxes on consumption. 
In this paper we take a closer look at the role indirect taxes play in social policy in 
Belgium, and at the distributional effects of a shift from employee social 
contributions to indirect taxes for financing social security. For this purpose we 
combine the data of the Household Budget Survey and the Socio-Economic Panel, as 
well as two microsimulation models, namely ASTER (for the calculation of indirect 
taxes) and MISIM (for the calculation of personal income taxes and social 
contributions). We focus on three specific issues: 
1.  How are indirect taxes distributed over the population in comparison with 
personal income taxes and social contributions? The links between taxes and 
benefits and their joint distribution effects are increasingly the subject of research 
(see e.g. Immervoll et al., 2006), though the focus is mainly on the relationship 
between personal income taxes and social security. The effect of indirect taxes 
often remains unanalysed. A first step in our analysis is to compare the 
distributive characteristics of indirect taxes with those of personal income taxes 
and social contributions.  
2.  How are taxes paid out of benefits distributed? As the government takes back 
part of social benefits through indirect taxes, the real social effort is in fact less 
than aggregate social expenditures would indicate (Adema, 1999; Adema & 
Ladaique, 2005). Adema (1999) argues that “the amount of indirect taxes paid on   3
consumption out of benefit income should be deducted from total benefit income 
in order to get the net effort of the government on social objectives”. 
3.  What are the distributional consequences of an alternative way of funding social 
security? We simulate a revenue neutral shift from employee social insurance 
contributions to indirect taxes, and calculate the distributional consequences. 
In section 2 we discuss the two datasets and the two microsimulation models that 
are used. Next, we compare the distribution of indirect taxes with that of personal 
income taxes and social contributions. The distributional effects of a shift from social 
contributions to indirect taxes for funding social security is the subject of section 4. 
The last section concludes. 
2  METHODOLOGY 
Indirect taxes are levied on expenditures, whereas income taxes and social 
contributions are levied on individual or household income. Most socio-economic 
datasets have reliable and detailed data on either expenditures or income. This 
applies also for Belgium: the Household Budget Survey (HBS) is used for the analysis 
of expenditures, whereas the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) is considered to be an 
appropriate source for detailed income information. Therefore, we combine these 
two datasets by imputing expenditures of the HBS in the dataset of SEP, using semi-
parametric estimation of Engel curves (see section 2.1). As the datasets do not have 
information on direct or indirect taxes, these are simulated using the microsimulation 
technique. Personal income taxes and social contributions are calculated on the SEP-
data using MISIM, while indirect taxes are calculated on the expenditure data with 
the model ASTER (see section 2.2). Thus, this research entails not only a combination 
of two datasets, but also a combination of two microsimulation models.  
2.1 DATA: MATCHING TWO DATASETS 
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) 
The Social and Economic Panel (SEP) is a representative sample of private Belgian 
households, which encompasses four waves (1985, 1988, 1992 and 1997). The data can 
be used as a panel or as a cross section. We use here the 1997 database which 
includes 4,632 households and 12.260 individuals. As we work in the 
microsimulation model with the tax-benefit legislation of 2005, all income data have 
been indexed to 2005 using the consumer price index. 
The SEP includes data about various kinds of income, as well as different socio-
economic characteristics of the households and individual household members over 
the age of 18. These characteristics concern household composition and activity   4
status, education level, occupation and hours of employment of each of the 
household members. In addition, the survey includes questions about the housing 
situation. The SEP-database also contains information about real estate and financial 
property of the households, and about their disposable income. The SEP-surveys 
measure monthly incomes. The overall disposable income of a household 
encompasses all net wages from primary or secondary employment, self-
employment incomes, social security benefits (retirement pension, unemployment 
benefit, child benefit, sickness and invalidity benefit) and various other types of 
income (such as alimony, rental proceeds, scholarships, social assistance from local 
public welfare centres). 
As the SEP-database contains only net monthly amounts, it does not contain direct 
information about the amount of income tax paid by the households, or about 
employees’ social security payments or other personal contributions. This 
information is therefore calculated using MISIM (cf. infra). The SEP does not contain 
expenditure data either; these are imputed from the Household Budget Survey. 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) 
The expenditure survey of 2001 is a sample of Belgian private sociological 
households. In this context a household is defined as all people that live together and 
who jointly make decisions concerning, for example, the household budget. Collective 
households such as convent communities, hospitals or prisons are not included in the 
expenditure survey. In total 3,726 households participated in the expenditure survey 
2001 representing 8,553 individuals. We can further distinguish three broad categories 
of information in the survey. 
1.  Household expenditures. These are always reported at the household level. Hence, 
we cannot attribute consumption expenditures to individual household members. 
2.  Income. Amounts are reported by the individual household members. It are mostly 
net incomes that we observe in the budget survey. Some incomes that are not 
attributable to individual household members are reported at the household level. 
3.  Household characteristics. At the household level we find for example dwelling 
characteristics, number of children, …. At the individual level it will mostly be 
relationship characteristics, such as the relation of a household member to the 
head of the household. The latter is considered the one who defends the 
household’s interests and takes care of most of the administrative duties. Typically 
it is the person that has the highest income and contributes most to household 
income. 
This information is collected by effectively contacting the respondents who fill out 
most of the requested information. As of 1999 a random sample of about 300 
households is drawn each month. Those households then record all expenditures and 
income during that month. Additional questionnaires provide information   5
concerning the dwelling and other socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
This way we can think of the budget survey as a continuous survey.  
Imputation of expenditures in SEP 
The imputation of expenditures in the Socio-Economic Panel is implemented 
using semi-parametric estimation of Engel curves. In this section we will briefly 
outline the major steps undertaken in the implementation. 
The general form for Engel curves can be written as: 
  ( ) , ii i wg y ε = + z , (1) 
with  i w  the budget share on good i,  y  disposable income, z  a vector of household 
characteristics, and  i ε  a random error term.2 The function  ( ) .,. i g  is an unknown 
function that needs to be estimated without recourse to any parametric specification. 
When the vector z  has high dimension, say n , a fully nonparametric estimation of 
() .,. g  becomes unfeasible or else would require an enormous amount of data. To 
circumvent this we resorted to a semi-parametric specification where we retained 
only disposable income and age of the household head in the nonparametric part. 
The other household characteristics remain in the vector z  (now dimension  2 n− ) 
and enter the Engel curve specification linearly. The latter can then be written as: 
  ( ) , ii i i wF y a g e ε ′ = ++ β z , (2) 
where  ( ) .,. i F  is a function of age (of the household head) and disposable income 
with no a-priori assumed functional form. In the appendix (section 6.1) we describe 
some technical details on how we have implemented (2). The result of this 
imputation procedure is an income dataset enriched with expenditure data (hence 
referred to as “SEP-HBS”). 
2.2 MICROSIMULATION MODELS 
There are two reasons for using the microsimulation technique here. Firstly, 
microsimulation models are ideally suited to analyse alternative policy proposals, 
which is done in section 4. Secondly, some crucial information is not available in the 
dataset(s), namely social contributions, personal income taxes and indirect taxes. 
Personal income taxes and social contributions are calculated on the SEP-data using 
MISIM, while indirect taxes are calculated on the expenditure data with the model 
ASTER.  
                                                      
2   We will stick to the usual terminology of budget share here, although we make use of 
shares in disposable income in the empirical application.   6
ASTER  
ASTER  is a microsimulation model for indirect taxes applicable to the Belgian 
indirect tax system (see Decoster, 1995; Decoster et al., 1997). As in most other 
countries, in Belgium, three types of indirect taxes can be distinguished: excises, VAT 
and ad valorem taxes. The link between the producer price and the consumer price 
for commodity i  can be written as: 
  ( )( ) 1, ii i i i i qt p a v q =+ ++⋅  (3) 
where  i q  denotes the consumer price for commodity i,  i p  the producer price,  i a  the 
excise tax,  i v  an ad valorem tax rate applied on the consumer price and  i t  the VAT-
rate. 
For the simulations in this paper we used the 2005 indirect tax system and 
deflated it to 2001 values to be applied to data of the 2001 household budget survey. 
ASTER has 13 aggregate commodity classes covering expenditures on 974 individual 
items. In appendix 6.2 we explain how we have defined tax rates on consumption 
aggregates, and how we have split up the total tax rate as a percentage of the producer 
price (denoted below as  K τ ) into a VAT- and an excise component (denoted 
respectively by 
t
K τ   and 
a
K τ ). The tax rates for the 13 aggregate commodities are 
reported in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: IMPLICIT INDIRECT TAX RATES ON THE 13 AGGREGATES AND SAVING (AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE 
PRODUCER PRICE) USING DATA FROM THE BUDGET SURVEY 2001 
aggregate  total indirect tax 
rate( K τ  in %) 
implicit vat rate 
(
t
K τ  in %) 
implicit excise tax 
rate (
a
K τ  in %) 
food 6.2  6.1  0.1 
non-alcoholic beverages  7.7  6.1  1.6 
alcohol 40.9  24.5  16.4 
tobacco 207.5  184.1  23.4 
clothing 20.8  20.8  0.0 
rent and utilities  4.2  4.0  0.1 
heating 24.9  20.9  4.0 
private transportation  47.4  21.9  25.5 
public transportation  5.3  5.3  0.0 
hygienics, health  7.7  7.7  0.0 
leisure commodities  10.7  10.7  0.0 
other 7.2  7.2  0.0 
durables 20.9  20.9  0.0 
saving 0.0  0.0  0.0 
total 10.9  9.3  1.5 
Table 2 and Table 3 give a picture of consumption patterns over deciles of 
equivalent income in the budget survey. The first decile represents the 10% least well   7
off individuals and the last decile the 10% wealthiest individuals in the population in 
terms of equivalent income3. As is the case in many countries, also in Belgium a great 
part of peoples’ budgets is spent on rent and the share diminishes as people become 
wealthier. The same pattern applies for food, the second highest budget share for 
individuals up to the fifth decile. In the higher deciles larger parts of the budget are 
spent on leisure commodities and durables. These categories typically also contain 
the most commodities that can be labeled as luxuries. 
TABLE 2: BUDGET SHARES PER DECILE OF EQUIVALENT INCOME (BUDGET SURVEY 2001) 
decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  total 
food  17.8 18.0 15.7 15.8 15.7 14.5 13.7 13.4 12.7 11.1 14.8 
non-alcoholic 
beverages 
1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
alcohol  1.1 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 
tobacco  2.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.1 
clothing  3.7 4.0 4.9 5.0 6.3 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.3 6.9 5.4 
rent and 
utilities 
34.5 30.5 29.7 27.7 26.2 25.0 27.2 24.7 23.2 22.1 27.1 
heating  1.2 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.6 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.6 1.2 
private 
transportation 
4.2 5.3 6.1 5.8 6.5 7.2 6.6 7.4 9.0 9.4 6.7 
public 
transportation 
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 
hygienics, 
health 
6.3 7.1 7.1 6.6 6.8 6.3 7.1 6.8 5.9 6.2 6.6 
leisure 
commodities 
9.5  11.1 11.8 13.5 13.4 15.9 15.3 14.8 16.5 16.5 13.8 
other  12.0 11.3 11.5 12.8 12.8 12.1 12.4 11.8 12.0 13.5 12.2 
durables  5.4 6.4 7.1 7.0 7.1 8.2 7.5  10.1  10.0  10.3  7.9 
total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Looking at income shares in Table 3, the same general patterns emerge, although 
food now makes up an even smaller part of income for the higher deciles. From this 
table it is also clear that a great part of the income of the wealthiest goes into saving, 
which is negative for the first four deciles and then grows to reach almost a third of 
total income for the highest decile. 
MISIM  
MISIM (MicroSImulationModel) is a static microsimulation model, which enables 
to evaluate policy alternatives in the field of social security and personal taxation. It 
is a tax-benefit model, developed in the line of the one presented in Atkinson & 
Sutherland (1988) and developed by the Centre for Social Policy (see Cantillon et al. 
                                                      
3 The equivalence scale used is the square root of the number of household members.   8
1993a; Verbist, 2002). MISIM can perform simulations of unemployment schemes, 
child allowances, personal income taxes, social insurance contributions, social rent 
legislation, study allowances, etc.  
TABLE 3: INCOME SHARES PER DECILE OF EQUIVALENT INCOME (BUDGET SURVEY 2001) 
decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  total 
food  19.8 17.6 15.2 14.7 13.5 12.4 11.2 10.6  9.6  6.8  13.1 
non-alcoholic 
beverages  1.6 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.1 
alcohol  1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.3 
tobacco  2.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 
clothing  2.2 3.9 4.9 4.7 5.7 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.6 
rent and 
utilities  38.1 30.5 29.0 25.6 23.2 22.0 22.5 19.6 17.8 13.8 24.2 
heating  1.1 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.2 
private 
transportation  2.2 5.5 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 5.6 6.3 7.2 6.7 5.8 
public 
transportation  1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 
hygienics, 
health  6.6 7.6 7.3 6.3 6.4 5.8 6.3 5.7 4.6 4.4 6.1 
leisure 
commodities  12.8 11.9 12.5 13.8 12.7 14.7 13.5 12.6 13.2 10.9 12.9 
other  14.0 12.0 12.2 14.0 12.0 11.2 11.4 10.2  9.7  9.2  11.6 
durables 6.4  10.5  10.6  9.5  9.4 10.3 8.7 13.9  12.4 9.6 10.1 
saving  -9.4 -6.2 -4.4 -0.1 6.0  7.2 12.1 11.7 17.0 31.2 6.5 
total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
The SEP database exclusively contains information about net incomes, not gross 
incomes. It is, however, impossible to draw conclusions regarding distributive effects 
of income tax and parafiscal measures on the basis of data about net incomes. This 
requires information about gross incomes. In order to obtain this information, the net 
incomes are converted into gross amounts by means of the so-called ‘net-to-gross 
trajectory’. To make this conversion, one first calculates the withholding tax on 
earnings from employment, so that one arrives at the taxable income on a monthly 
basis. Then on the basis of this monthly income, we calculate the personal social 
security contributions which yields gross income. Ultimately, income tax is 
calculated on the basis of annual income. The survey, however, asks about monthly 
earned and replacement incomes. These amounts must, therefore, be converted into 
annual amounts. The year under consideration is the year that precedes the moment 
of questioning. The survey provides some information about changes that may have 
occurred in the course of the previous year (i.e. the year prior to questioning). Insofar 
as this is possible, such transitions are taken into account in the model. We then 
calculate personal income taxes, following as closely as possible the tax legislation   9
(for more details, see Verbist, 2002). We have applied here the tax legislation of 
income year 2005 on the indexed data of SEP. 
Simulations with a microsimulation model are of course only meaningful for 
policy purposes if the model and the data are sufficiently realistic. A comparison 
with data from administrative statistics indicates that incomes simulated with MISIM 
on the basis of SEP-data are satisfactorily representative. We may therefore conclude 
that the simulations conducted by MISIM are sufficiently reliable (see Verbist, 2002). 
Table 4 gives the composition of gross income over deciles of equivalent income in 
SEP4. On average, about three quarters of gross income consists of labour income, 
11% are made up of pensions, and the rest comes from other benefits and other 
income sources. As can be expected, the proportion of income from work increases 
with income level: in the lowest decile, only 11% of income comes from work, against 
80% at the top of the income distribution (note that the proportion of income from 
self-employed work is very high in this decile). The reverse pattern applies for social 
benefits: pensions and unemployment benefits make up 36%, resp. 26% of gross 
income at the bottom of the income distribution against 11% resp. 2.5% at the top. 
TABLE 4: COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOME PER DECILE OF EQUIVALENT INCOME (SEP-MISIM 2005) 
decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  total 
Labour  income    11.2 41.7 58.6 69.5 73.1 79.3 79.3 82.0 83.4 80.4 74.4 
- labour income 
employee  8.3  37.0 54.0 63.2 63.7 72.0 69.7 74.6 70.2 58.4 63.1 
- labour income 
self-employed  2.4 4.6 4.6 6.2 9.3 7.1 9.6 7.3 13.0  21.9  11.2 
Pensions  36.4 24.8 19.6 14.3 12.4  9.3 9.0 7.3 8.0 8.6 11.4 
Sickness and 
invalidity 
benefits  3.6 7.5 3.3 3.4 1.3 2.2 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.6 2.0 
Unemployment 
benefits  25.8  7.2 5.8 3.0 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.4 2.5 
Other income 
(*)  23.0 18.8 12.7 9.8  11.1 7.6 8.1 7.7 6.8 10.0  9.8 
total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
(*) Other income includes child benefits, study allowances, social assistance, alimony 
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3  DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND THE TAX BASE 
We now compare the distribution characteristics of indirect taxes with those of 
personal income taxes and social contributions. This means that we look at the 
transition from gross to final income (see scheme below). 
 Gross  income 
- Employee  social  contributions 
 Pre-tax  income 
- Personal  income  taxes 
 Net  Income 
-   Indirect taxes 
 Final  income 
We first compare the distribution of indirect taxes with that of other taxes (section 
3.1). We also look at the redistributive effect of the various tax types in Belgium and 
other countries. In section 3.2 we analyse the impact of indirect taxes on social 
benefits. As indirect taxes reduce the real value of consumption financed out of social 
benefits, and as these taxes are financial flows back to the Treasury, they in fact 
reduce social policy efforts. 
3.1 DISTRIBUTION OF INDIRECT TAXES COMPARED TO OTHER TAXES  
We compare the distribution of indirect taxes with the one of personal income 
taxes and own contributions. Own contributions consist of employee social 
contributions on salaries, contributions paid by the self-employed, and contributions 
paid on social benefits (more specifically on pensions and on sickness and invalidity 
benefits). Table 5 gives an overview of the share of the different taxes as a percentage 
of both gross and disposable income for deciles of equivalent income. Personal 
income taxes are progressive, as the average tax rate increases with income. Indirect 
taxes are regressive. The overall tax system remains progressive, even after taking 
indirect taxes into account.   11
TABLE 5: TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF INCOME (SEP-HBS) 
























1 1,2  -0,2  11,4  12,4  1,3  -0,2  12,2  13,4 
2 5,8  2,8  10,8  19,5  5,9  2,8  10,9  19,6 
3 8,7  8,7  10,5  27,8  8,0  8,0  9,8  25,8 
4 10,8  15,2  10,5  36,5  9,4  13,2  9,1  31,6 
5 11,9  18,1  10,2  40,2  10,0  15,3  8,6  33,9 
6 13,3  23,5  10,0  46,9  10,6  18,7  8,0  37,4 
7 14,0  27,5  9,7  51,3  10,9  21,3  7,5  39,7 
8 14,4  31,1  9,5  55,0  10,8  23,3  7,2  41,2 
9 15,7  35,3  9,3  60,3  11,5  25,8  6,8  44,0 
10 15,6  41,9  8,6  66,1  11,0  29,6  6,1  46,7 
all 
individuals  12,8 25,8 9,7  48,2  10,1  20,4  7,7  38,3 
In Table 6, using data from the Socio-Economic Panel, we show the redistributive 
effect and liability progression of taxes by respectively calculating the Reynolds-
Smolensky index and the Kakwani index. Both are calculated as the difference 
between the Gini and the appropriate concentration coefficient. Personal income 
taxes shift, on average, income from top to bottom, while the reverse is true for 
indirect taxes. Also own contributions have a positive redistributive effect, be it far 
smaller than personal income taxes. The fact that own contributions are progressive 
may be surprising, as in Belgium employee contributions are in general proportional, 
and self employed contributions even have a regressive structure. There are several 
reasons for this progressivity: 1) salaries are situated relatively more in the higher 
end of the income distribution (see Table 4); 2) there is a substantial reduction in 
contributions for low salaries; 3) also for social benefits contributions are 
considerably reduced for low pensions and low sickness and invalidity benefits; 
moreover no contributions are levied on unemployment benefits. 
The combined tax/contributions system is progressive, although less so than 
personal income taxes taken separately. Especially the measure for liability 
progression decreases (by some 40%) when indirect taxes and social contributions are 
taken into account. 








redistributive effect  0.0116  0.0550  -0.0033  0.0634 
(Reynolds-Smolensky)        
liability progression  0.1100  0.2150  -0.1118  0.1366 
  (Kakwani)         12
Similar patterns are found in other countries (see O’Donoghue et al., 2004). Table 7 
presents the Reynolds-Smolensky coefficient for the three tax types in 12 EU-
countries5. In all countries personal income taxes are the most redistributive 
instrument of the three. Also, indirect taxes are everywhere regressive, and hence 
anti-redistributive. Compared to other countries, the effect of indirect taxes in 
Belgium is relatively small, whereas the redistributive effect of both personal income 
taxes and social contributions is relatively high. 







Belgium 0.023  0.065  -0.006 
Finland 0.010  0.048  -0.036 
France 0.014  0.035  -0.043 
Greece -0.002  0.040  -0.028 
Ireland 0.009  0.058  -0.036 
Italy 0.006  0.021  -0.031 
Luxembourg 0.007 0.073  -0.013 
The Netherlands  0.007  0.056  -0.013 
Portugal 0.002  0.046  -0.035 
Spain -0.003  0.049  -0.019 
Sweden 0.004  0.033  -0.020 
UK 0.009  0.046  -0.030 
Source: EUROMOD, O’Donoghue et al., 2004. 
Note: Income has been equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale 1/0.5/0.3. 
3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF INDIRECT TAXES PAID OUT OF SOCIAL BENEFITS  
When looking for alternative paths it is also important to consider what the 
potential impact is on benefit recipients. In the case of a shift from employee 
contributions towards indirect taxes it can be expected that this may be anti-
redistributive, and that social b e n e f i t  r e c i p i e n t s  w i l l  b e  l o s e r s  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n .  
Various publications of the OECD (Adema et al, 1996; Adema, 1999, Adema & 
Ladaique, 2005) have pointed out the fact that the net effort of the government on 
social objectives is lower than gross social expenditure indicators tell. Both 
consumption taxes and direct taxes on benefits establish a flow back to the 
government in tax receipts. For benefit recipients, consumption of goods and services 
is paid out of social benefits, which reduces the real value of consumption that can be 
financed out of a given level of benefits. In some countries, this is explicitly 
accounted for (Australia, for instance, introduced a compensation package for social 
                                                      
5 The figures for Belgium in Table 7 differ somewhat from those found with SEP-HBS. The 
figures in Table 7 are calculated on another dataset and with another microsimulation 
model, and another equivalence scale is used.   13
benefit recipients together with the Goods and Services Taxes; Canada supports low-
income households through a Goods and Services Tax rebate) (Adema & Ladaique, 
2005). 
Adema and Ladaique (2005) calculate the average implicit indirect tax rates of 
consumption out of benefit income, and express them as a percentage of GDP (see 
Table 8). There is a wide variation among countries. In general, countries with high 
gross social expenditure levels also have higher indirect taxes (e.g. Scandinavian 
countries), whereas the opposite applies for countries with relatively low benefit 
levels, such as the US, Australia and Canada. Belgium belongs to the middle group, 
together with other continental welfare states. 
TABLE 8: INDIRECT TAXES ON CONSUMPTION OUT OF BENEFIT INCOME, AVERAGE IMPLICIT TAX RATES AND AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2001. 
 average  implicit 
indirect tax rate of 
consumption out of 
benefit income 
Indirect taxes paid out of consumption of 
total cash transfers, in percentage of GDP 
Australia 9.9  1.4 
Austria 16.2  2.9 
Belgium 14.4  2.5 
Canada 11.2  1.2 
Denmark 26.5  3.5 
Finland 21.4  2.3 
France 15.9  3.1 
Germany 13.7  2.9 
Ireland 19.9  1.6 
Italy 13.1  2.2 
The Netherlands  17.4  2.8 
Spain 13.0  1.6 
Sweden 20.7  2.9 
UK 13.5  2.4 
US 4.4  0.5 
Source: Adema & Ladaique, 2005. 
These macro figures do not tell anything about the distribution of indirect taxes 
paid out of social benefits. In Table 9 we give an estimate of this distribution for 
Belgium. Even though the VAT rate on necessities is lower than for other goods and 
services, and even though the relative use of this kind of goods is higher at the 
bottom of the distribution and among benefit recipients, also indirect taxes paid out 
of benefits are regressive.    14
TABLE 9: SOCIAL BENEFITS AS A % OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, INDIRECT TAXES PAID OUT OF SOCIAL BENEFITS  
 
Social benefits as % of 
disposable income 
Indirect taxes paid 
out of benefits as % of 
benefits 
Indirect taxes paid 
out of benefits as % of 
disposable income 
1 75.8  11.3  8.5 
2 50.3  10.6  5.3 
3 39.1  10.3  4.0 
4 29.1  10.2  3.0 
5 24.3  9.9  2.4 
6 20.4  9.9  2.0 
7 19.5  9.6  1.9 
8 16.4  9.6  1.6 
9 14.2  9.4  1.3 
10 12.1  8.6  1.0 
all individuals  23.6  10.0  2.4 
Source: SEP-HBS, MISIM-ASTER 
4  ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
In this part we look at a policy proposal whereby social security contributions 
paid by employees are reduced by 25% and the loss in revenue compensated by an 
increase in indirect tax rates, more specifically VAT. Taking into account the extra 
revenue from personal income taxes, we thus make sure that the reform is revenue 
neutral. 
In this simulation we only look at static effects, that is, labour supply reactions are 
not taken into account. We also make the assumption that the reduction in social 
security contributions translates completely into an increase in gross labour income. 
Personal income taxes are of course recalculated for the changed gross income. In the 
microsimulation model for indirect taxes, ASTER, a detailed demand system is 
available. This allows  to take behavioural reactions as a consequence of changes in 
relative prices into account. The data used come from the Socio-Economic Panel and 
the imputed expenditures therein. 
The total net budgetary cost of the reform was calculated to be around €1329 
million, i.e. the difference between the cost of the 25% reduction in social security 
contributions and the extra revenue collected from personal income taxes due to 
higher labour incomes. Since the VAT liabilities in ASTER only account for about 62% 
of total indirect tax revenue collected in Belgium, we limited the cost to be recovered 
through an increase in VAT rates to 62% of the total net budgetary cost.6 The net 
budgetary cost to be financed then amounts to €824.10 million (figures for 2005). This 
cost was found to be exactly offset by increasing VAT tax rates by a factor 1.0773, i.e. a 
                                                      
6   ASTER only includes VAT revenue from private households.   15
VAT rate of 6% becomes 6.46% and a rate of 21% becomes 22.62%. Table 10 
summarizes the costs of the reform, the last row shows the revenue from increasing 
the VAT rates by a factor 1.0773. 
TABLE 10: BUDGETARY COST OF REDUCTION IN EMPLOYEE SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS, 2005 
  cost (in million euro) 
reduction of employee contributions 2791.04 
increase in personal income tax revenue  1461.84 
total net budgetary cost  1329.20 
net budgetary cost to be recovered from private households 
(62% of total net cost in € of 2005) 
824.10 
  revenue (in million euro) 
increase VAT rates by a factor 1.0773  824.10 
In Table 11 we show the changes in equivalent disposable income, the change in 
(equivalent) consumption due to changes in relative prices, and the combined effect 
as a result of the reduction in employee social security contributions and the 
subsequent increase in VAT rates to ensure revenue neutrality.7 Results are shown per 
decile of equivalent disposable income. The change in disposable income due to the 
reduction of social security contributions clearly favours the higher income deciles, 
but when we look at the change in consumption due to the increase in vat rates the 
effects are just the opposite: higher income deciles lose more — their consumption 
decreases more in absolute terms than that of lower deciles. The combined effect, 
however, confirms the first observation, namely that individuals in higher income 
deciles win more than their counterparts with less income. The combined effect of 
the reforms even makes individuals in the lowest two deciles worse off than they 
were before the reform. The change in disposable income does not cover the change 
in relative prices due to the increase in VAT rates. The lower deciles have relatively 
high income shares for some of the most heavily taxed commodities, such as tobacco 
and to a lesser extent heating. 
                                                      
7    The decomposition of the effect on household welfare into the effect of the changed 
disposable income and the price change is explained in the appendix (section 6.3).   16















1 8209.0  13.5  -57.7  -44.2 
2 11302.3  62.9 -72.2 -9.3 
3 13394.4  126.1  -82.3 43.8 
4 15121.7  159.7  -90.5 69.2 
5 16781.3  206.3  -97.0  109.3 
6 18352.6  249.9  -103.9  145.9 
7 20274.4  279.8  -111.3  168.6 
8 22525.1  332.4  -119.7  212.7 
9 25876.5  369.1  -132.9  236.3 
10 34849.4  427.9  -163.6  264.5 
Total 18008.4 209.0  -100.3  108.8 






























































as % of disposable income
 
Table 12 is similar to Table 11 but it shows the effects per age class. Here there is 
no clear pattern in consumption changes due to changes in relative prices. All age 
classes lose approximately the same absolute amounts. The combined effect is more   17
outspoken, i.e. it shows a clear loss for the two last age classes, the individuals older 
than 60. The change in disposable incomes for these groups is rather limited, given 
that the larger part in these age classes will be pensioners who do not enjoy the 
positive effects of a reduction in employee social security contributions. 














<20 18033.8  291.2 -105.3 185.7 
>=20 & <30  17921.0  327.2  -106.0  221.2 
>=30 & <40  18179.9  294.6  -99.0  195.9 
>=40 & <50  19595.0  307.2  -104.9  202.3 
>=50 & <60  20023.6  272.8  -109.3  163.7 
>=60 & <70  16952.1  61.6  -100.2  -38.6 
>=70 14693.7  20.1  -82.0  -61.8 
Total 18008.4 209.0  -100.3  108.8 
This is also illustrated by Figure 2 and Figure 3, which show the income and price 
change by socio-professional category: salaried workers (civil servants and 
employees) are clearly winners in the proposed scenario, whereas those who cannot 
benefit from the social contributions reduction (the self-employed and inactive) 
loose. 
The effect on income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is slightly 
negative, with an increase from 0.21883 pre reform to 0.22002 post reform. This is not 
surprising as in this scenario the weight of a progressive, and hence redistributive, 
instrument (namely employee contributions) is reduced, whereas the weight of the 
anti-redistributive instrument (indirect taxes is increased).   18
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5  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have investigated the distributional consequences of an 
alternative way of financing social security. Proposals on alternatives mostly focus 
on efficiency and macro considerations, but it is also important to take account of the 
micro level and of distributional concerns. We have used a combined 
microsimulation model, as it is the most appropriate tool for this kind of 
distributional analysis. The policy proposal consisted of a reduction of social security 
contributions paid by employees with 25%, which was compensated by an increase 
in indirect tax rates, more specifically VAT. Taking into account the extra revenue 
from personal income taxes, we applied a revenue neutral reform. 
Our results indicated a gain for the higher income groups, whereas those at the 
lower end were the losers. In this scenario, the redistributive effect of overall taxes 
diminished slightly. The shift from employee contributions to indirect taxes also 
entails an intergenerational effect: the income position of the elderly worsened, 
whereas that from those at active age improved. Not surprisingly, also benefit 
recipients were mainly losers, as their real value of consumption declined in this 
simulation. These results follow intuition, but it is nevertheless important to make 
them visible, and to show that distributional concerns do matter. If a scenario as the 
one we have investigated would come into being, then it might be appropriate to 
provide a kind of compensation for benefit recipients, as was for instance done in 
Australia in 2001. 
6  APPENDIX 
6.1 SEMI-PARAMETRIC IMPUTATION OF BUDGET SHARES ON THE SEP DATABASE 
Rewriting (2) as: 
  ( ) , ii i i F y age w ν ′ = −+ β z , (4) 
where  i ν  is a random error term with conditional expectation equal to zero allows to 
formulate the regression analogue of (4) as: 
  ( ) ( ) ,, . ii i F y age E w y age ′ =− β z  (5) 
Once we have estimates for the beta coefficients, (5) can be estimated by use of 
standard nonparametric regression techniques. Beta coefficients can be estimated 
from (2) by taking the expectation of (2) conditional on age and disposable income 
and subtracting this again from (2) to eliminate  ( ) , i F y age  to get: 
  ( ) ( ) ,, ii i i w E w y age E y age ε ⎡⎤ ′ −= −+ ⎣⎦ β zz , (6)   20
which can be estimated using simple OLS regression. 
For the estimation, the conditional expectation terms in (6) are replaced by their 
nonparametric estimates which are, respectively: 
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and  y b  and  age b  are the bandwidths of respectively income and age in the budget 
survey. The summation is over all households h  of the budget survey. To satisfy 
adding-up the bandwidths are chosen optimally, but are not adaptive. Hence, the 
bandwidths are independent of the type of commodity and are the same for all 
households. Filling in the estimated beta coefficients in (5) allows nonparametric 
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For imputation of budget shares in the Socio-Economic Panel we make use of the 
overlapping variables  y ,  age, and the household characteristics in z  as well as the 
conditional expectation of  i w : 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , ii i E w y age E y age F y age ′ =+ β z . (11) 
The linear part poses no problem. The estimated beta coefficients can be applied to 
the corresponding variables in the Socio-Economic Panel. A bit more demanding is 
the imputation of  ( ) , i F y age  in the Socio-Economic Panel. For this we make use of 
expression (10) in which the points of estimation,  y  and age, will now be 
observations from the Socio-Economic Panel. Let index bs indicate observations   21
from the budget survey and sp  observations from the Socio-Economic Panel. 
Households in the budget survey are identified by subscript h and households in the 
Socio-Economic Panel by subscript  j . For each household  j  in the Socio-Economic 
Panel, the imputed function  ( ) .,. i F  for good i is given by (an imputed value is 
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% . (12) 
The imputed budget share for good i for household  j  in the Socio-Economic 
Panel is then calculated as8: 
  ( ) ˆ ,.
sp sp sp sp
ij i j i j j w F y age ′ =+ β z % %  (13) 
6.2 CALCULATION OF INDIRECT TAX RATES ON CONSUMPTION AGGREGATES 
Re-arranging (3) and solving for the producer price  i p  we find: 
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 (14) 












Expression (15) will be used to infer the (fixed) producer price from the known 
consumer price  i q  and excise tax  i a . 







α =  (16) 
Replacing  i α  in equation (3) by making use of (16), we obtain: 
  ( ) ( ) 1, ii i i i i i qt pp v q α =+⋅ +⋅+⋅  (17) 
which, after re-arrangement, ca, be written as: 
                                                      
8   Remark that, to be correct, this should read as the conditional budget share, i.e. 
( ) ,
sps p s p
ij j j E w y age % , since we do not add back an error term to the imputed value in this 
exercise.   22




























 is the ratio of consumer to producer price for commodity 
i . From this we can obtain the total tax rate for commodity i  as: 
  1 ii z τ = −  (19) 
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where the total tax rate  i τ  has now been decomposed into an implicit VAT-rate 
t
i τ  
and an implicit excise tax rate 
a
i τ . 
The total tax rates  i τ  and the two components 
t
i τ  and 
a
i τ  have all been expressed 
in relation to the producer price for the commodity. To calculate the tax liability from 
observable expenditures  ii i eq x = , the following manipulations have been applied: 
  ii i i Tp x τ =  (23) 
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ii TT =+  (28) 
where 
t
i T  and 
a
i T  refer to VAT and excise tax liability for commodity i respectively. 
All the above formulae can be applied to individual commodities. However, in 
simulations, we will use tax rates on aggregates. The tax liability for commodity 
aggregate  K , denoted by  K T , is obtained as the sum of the tax liabilities paid on the 
individual commodities:   23
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Those tax rates are then used to calculate the tax liabilities on aggregate 
expenditures: 
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6.3 CONSUMPTION BASED WELFARE 
A theoretically sound way to calculate welfare effects of income and price changes 
is to use the money metric based on the expenditure function  (,) euq, where u refers 
to the utility level  and q to the vector of consumer prices (see King, 1983). Since 
disposable income of household h equals  (,) euq, the welfare gain of a change in 
disposable income and in consumer prices can be written as: 
 
0 1 0 1 01 100 0 (,,,) (, ( (,) ) (, ( (,) ) WG q q y y e q u f q y e q u f q y =−, (38) 
where we use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote pre- and post reform situations, and 
where  u(.) denotes the direct utility function with as arguments the quantities 
consumed. The latter result from the Marshallian demand functions  (,) f qy. In (38) 
we used the pre-reform prices 
0 q  as reference prices.  
This welfare gain can be rewritten as:   24
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The term in round brackets is the change in disposable income, displayed in 
column (1) of Table 12 of the main text. The term between square brackets captures 
the effect of the price change. If we refrain from making specific assumptions about 
the utility function, we can approximate this term by means of a Taylor expansion 
around the baseline prices q⁰: 
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01 '( , ) x qu the set of compensated demand functions for consumption goods. We 
have simulated these compensated demands by calculating a real income effect on 
observed pre-reform demands, derived from the non parametrically estimated 
Engel-curve.Using (40) in (39) gives us as an approximation of the welfare gain: 
 
0101 1 0 01 1 0 (,,,)( ) ' (,) ( ) WG q q y y y y x q u q q ≅−− −, (41) 
The second term is an aggregate measure of the price change, and is reported in 
column (2) of Table 12. The welfare gain itself is then the sum of both effects and 
given in column (3) of the same table.   25
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